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Abstract
Japan is geographically located on the fringe of Asia. Japan’s location is often
divided between those arguing that Japan is inside Asia and those arguing it is outside
Asia. Japanese ideas of Asian regionalism are thus immensely varied. This article details
a number of Japanese ideas on Asian regionalism with author/agency, scope and method
specified. Special mention is made of weak integration of government agencies, thus
causing proliferation of many Japanese ideas within Asia. With the increasing self-
assertiveness of China, the apparent peaking out of American hegemony, and the steady
rise of non-Chinese Asians, Japan tries to maintain enduring alliance with the United
States, to invigorate interdependence with China, and to reinvent new relationships
with the countries of the East Asian Summit. Japanese ideas of Asian regionalism take
those templates as guidelines to develop new ideas of Asian regionalism.
1. Introduction
Regionalism is defined as the aspirations and actions of banding together on a
regional basis to achieve common goals. Here are three inherent difficulties. First,
although it is not difficult to aspire jointly to achieve something, it is not easy to act
jointly; therefore, the normal ‘collective action’ problem arises (Olson, 1962). Second,
to do something on a regional basis is not easy. As the United Nations Security Council
permanent or semi-permanent membership dispute shows, neighbors are often most
difficult to handle (e.g., Bush, 2010 on Japan and China). Common goals are not easy
to set up. Brazil’s candidacy is opposed by Mexico and Argentina; Japan’s candidacy
is opposed by China and Korea; Germany’s candidacy is opposed by Italy; India’s
candidacy is opposed by Pakistan; and South Africa’s candidacy is opposed by Nigeria
and Egypt (Russett, 1997). Third, more recently, the tide of globalization has been so
deeply felt that the validity of confining actors and goals based on their regions is not so
easy to assess. Nevertheless, regionalism is always present (Asian Development Bank,
2008). It is alive and well in many regions, and this is also the case in Japan. In this
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paper, I examine Japanese ideas of Asian regionalism over the last century and beyond
in light of the above three kinds of difficulties. This examination is carried out in three
terms: normative, economic, and security.
2. Normative dimension of Japanese ideas of regionalism
Until the 1950s, one of the key Japanese ideas of Asian regionalism was anti-
colonialism (that is anti-Western colonialism), national self-determination, and
independence. From the time of the Japanese participation, as a victor in World War
One, in the Versailles conference of 1918 through to the Japanese entry into the United
Nations in 1956, this theme was repeated consistently. One can see some commonalities
between Prince (later Prime Minister) Fumimaro Konoe’s essay published in 1918,
stressing the theme of Western dominance in peace settlements and criticizing Western
colonialism which prevented national self-determination and racial equality, and
Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi’s United Nations speech in 1958, stressing national
independence, racial equality, and solidarity with Asia. It may not be an exaggeration
to say that this idea derives from the experience and memory of Japan facing the
threat of being conquered and colonized. This included the initial nineteenth century
opening of the country and ports by naval coercion, the imposition of extraterritoriality
and tariff non-autonomy long into the twentieth century, the steadily executed and
concerted Western economic embargoes against Japan, and the relentless execution
of war against Japan, which led Robert McNamara who designed the massive city
bombing of Japan, for one, to say that, unless the United States were a victor, it would
be charged as a war crime offender. One can argue that this line of writing Japanese
history faded by the 1960s remarkably swiftly. At the same time, one can counter
argue that this line of writing Japanese history dies hard, as evinced by the hard-to-
suppress dissonance of the two not-so-well-functioning bilateral history commissions
with Korea and China (Inoguchi, 2007). The memory of anti-colonial Japan makes
Japan’s ontological insecurity (Zarakol, 2010) difficult to erase. Japan’s defeat in World
War Two negated the key drives of modern Japan, at least it seemed to those who carry
some bones and tails of Konoe and Kishi: enlightenment and empowerment along
the Western way. All the efforts that led to 1945 ended in emptiness. This ontological
emptiness or insecurity sometimes makes Japanese ideas of regionalism more difficult
to prevail or to be accommodated in the region.
As a matter of fact, of the 32 countries in Asia which were surveyed by the
AsiaBarometer project during the period from 2003 to 2008, only two countries were
negative towards Japan’s impacts: Korea and China (https://www.asiabarometer.org/).
All the rest were remarkably positive about Japan’s impact on their own countries.
Along with Canada, Japan stands out as one of the most positively perceived countries
globally according to a BBC survey. Yet ontological insecurity intermittently arouses
dissonance with Korea and China. It looks as if any good idea of regionalism is bound
to stumble on this dimension before it is further articulated. It may be regarded as
intriguing to some that these three Northeast Asian economic giants have almost
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become a pillar of the world economy, with intraregional trade (between China, Japan,
and South Korea) exceeding 50% of total trade as of the early 2000s, only a decade
since the end of the Western and Japanese embargo against China that followed the
Tiananmen massacre of 1989. The much-vaunted European Union only achieved a
similar figure exceeding 50% a few decades after the Rome Treaty of 1957. One can
argue that despite all the disagreements over history, territory, and honor, the three
countries have established one of the densest and strongest regional zones for economic
transactions, trade, investment, technology flows, etc.; therefore, one does not have to
worry too much about normative issues – perhaps. Yet the nagging doubt remains when
disagreement swiftly and often so easily becomes the issue of vigorous contention. In
2006, when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Korea to encourage President Roh
Moo Hyun to conclude a bilateral free trade agreement, the latter refused for some
unknown reasons. The issue had been in progress since President Kim Dae-Jung’s
proposal, during a visit to Tokyo in 1998, for a free trade agreement, because Japan’s
agricultural lobby was difficult to persuade. Yes, this cannot be explained solely by
economics. After all, Korea has concluded such an agreement with the United States
and the European Union. Why not with Japan as well? Some say that he was angry about
Japan’s miniscule concessions on agricultural liberalization when Korea had agreed to
drastically liberalize its agricultural sector. Others say that the history issue came to his
mind suddenly, prompting him to say no when his staff had already prepared to sign the
document. In 2010, when the Japanese coast guard constrained the captain and crew of
a Chinese fishing vessel, who were fishing in the Japanese exclusive economic zone, the
Chinese government demanded that Japan release them immediately, apologize, and
make payment to China, and cancelled a number of bilateral interactions and threatened
to stop business transactions. Such contentions are not uncommon on issues related
to the law of the sea. Some Chinese protestors carried slogans opposing Japanese
aggression in the late 19th century. Only after Prime Minister Naoto Kan ordered the
release of the captain did Prime Minister Wen Jiabao call a halt to his government’s
actions and the two sides conversed for 20 minutes during the Asia-Europe meeting.
Why so much fuss on both sides? Yes, history as contended by both sides hangs heavily.
One can argue that Chinese aggressive behavior is not solely targeted against Japan,
but is sometimes also targeted against many, such as Norway for the decision to award
the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiaobo, or even against the Chinese government and the
Chinese Communist Party in a disguised form, since waving the anti-Japanese banner
enables demonstrators to act safely.
The point here, however, is that whatever the reasons for contentious interaction, it
seems that it is still necessary for much trust to be built before regional undertakings can
be given serious consideration. Ironically, interactions and transactions among the three
countries have steadily accumulated. Besides the history issue, normative vocabularies
of bilateral interaction include former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s fraternity
and President Hu Qintao’s harmonious society. Despite all their good intentions, these
phrases sound hollow against reality. So vague are they that they cannot become the
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basis of regional architecture, especially when normative issues – not only history
but also more broadly rule of law, freedom, property, human rights, democracy, free
passage, free trade, peaceful resolution of disputes, the environment etc., as is the
case with Hatoyama’s fraternity concept – must be taken up for serious and sustained
discussion. From Hatoyama’s point of view, these disagreements are so huge that one is
compelled to start from nothing, that is let us be friends before we begin discussion. In a
similar vein, both Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and President Kim Dae-Jung called for
building a future-oriented relationship. Their thinking was that when building a future-
oriented relationship, one can do so only on the basis of solid understanding of the
past, but one should not stumble on the past and never start building a future-oriented
relationship.
Looking at the normative dimensions of regionalist ideas in Japan, Korea, and
China, one gets the impression that they are thin and that to make them thicker invites
trouble immediately. That is why from the Japanese point of view, their regionalist
ideas have been dominated by what they call functionalist ideas, which try not to delve
into troublesome issues, including normative issues, directly, and leave economists to
discuss regionalist endeavors in the functionalist mold.
3. Economic dimensions of Japanese ideas of regionalism
‘Economics take command!’ may be the apt sentence for Japanese ideas of
regionalism. Or to put it differently, separate economics from politics. What are
Japanese economics like then? It starts from the old idea of the pattern of diffusion
of products and technologies in the 1930s through to the 1950s as observed in Japan’s
vicinity in Asia. The ‘flying geese’ pattern was coined by the economist, Kaname
Akamatsu (1965). Watching the slowly building economic protectionism and embargoes
surrounding Japan in the inter-war period, Professor Akamatsu discovered the pattern
of product and technology diffusion from Japan to Korea, Taiwan, Dalian, Shanghai,
Hong Kong, and further to Southeast Asia. This was a cascading pattern of diffusion
led by Japan. Although the real origins of diffusion of technology were often the
United States, it looked as if the Asia-Pacific region was Japan-led in an environment of
protectionism in the inter-war period. The same pattern was discovered in the post-war
period of the 1950s into the 1960s when many of the Southeast Asian countries were
still colonies of Western countries and when the United States was preoccupied with
fighting a war in Korea and watching civil wars in many parts of Asia, including China
and Vietnam. Into the 1960s through to the 1980s, Japanese economic development
went well and it looked as if the Asia-Pacific economy was embraced by Japan (Hatch
and Yamamura, 1996). In the 1980s, Japanese split into two schools of thought, one
the East Asia line, the other the Asia-Pacific line. The former became the ASEAN plus
Three (Japan, Korea, China) line whereas the latter became the APEC line. The APEC
line focused on economics and multilateralism led by the US. The ASEAN plus Three
focused on East Asia. Given the oft mutually difficult Three, using the arena of the
ASEAN meeting was most expedient and effective means to tie the Three together
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and to link the ASEAN with the Three. Into the 1990s, Chinese economic development
became very dynamic. Into the 2000s, regional economies grew so steadily that the three
Northeast Asian countries, especially China and Korea, became more global-oriented
than oriented to regional matters. From the Japanese point of view, the Japan-led
pattern of product and technology diffusion in East and Southeast Asia is still retained.
Furthermore, since Japanese direct investment started to shift from China to some
Southeast and South Asian countries, Japanese ideas of regionalism have become more
focused on non-Northeast Asia. China and Korea have temporarily reached the semi-
saturation of domestic demand at home. Both have gone global much more drastically
than Japan. At the same time, instead of exploring far peripheries at home, namely
Tibet, Xinjiang, and the southwest part of the country, China now focuses on those
provinces adjacent to coastal provinces, namely Anhui, Henan, Hebei, Hunan, Hubei,
and Sichuan, for its next focus for economic development. Korea now focuses on
consolidating domestic infrastructure so as to place every part of South Korea within
one and half hour’s reach of the capital, so that the entire country can become a
sort of greater metropolitan Seoul. Once diplomatic normalization is to be achieved
in a nebulous future, South Korea is most likely to invest a lot in infrastructure, both
industrial and non-industrial, so that North Korea can become a good market for South
Korean business as well. The high exchange rates of the Japanese yen, that seem to be
continuing for quite a while after the post-Lehman global recession, encourage many
Japanese manufacturing firms to shift to Vietnam, Indonesia, and India and many
other emerging economies because the highly valued yen is reducing the profitability
of exports of Japanese manufactured products from Japan. To some it may be mildly
intriguing to find that Japan regards itself as a front-runner in technology in East and
Southeast Asia and seeks to enhance its ties with Southeast Asian countries. Japan as
the first flying geese is alive and well! (Hatch, 2010). Indeed, when Asia alone (Tay, 2010)
thrives, Japan as a front-runner in technology in the region must perform its duties well.
As far as technology is concerned, Japan strives to achieve a strong partnership with
ASEAN countries. ERIA, the Economic Research Institute for East Asia and the ASEAN,
a think tank closely tied with Japan and the ASEAN for designing and implementing
ASEAN-wide industrial and resource locations, embodies such Japanese aspiration.
The challenge to Japanese technological superiority especially in Korea is so real that
no self-complacency should be entertained. In the longer term, demography and social
policy development seem to occupy the minds of Japanese policy makers. All the
Northeast Asian societies, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Japan, have been
reducing their population in the 2000s. China is about to enter into this club of fast-
shrinking populations and reduced economic growth rate. Of all the top ten military
powers in the world, it is estimated that only the United States and India and possibly
the United Kingdom will be still in the expansionary phase in 2050 (Haas, 2008). The
logical Japanese conclusion points to Chinese demographic standstill and reduction
that would encourage Japan to look further to the West, that is India and South and
Central Asia. With regard to social policy development in Asia, social policy expenditure
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faces difficulties in relation to demographic decline as productive population declines.
Social policy has a lot to with domestic stability since it provides a safety net. Whether
social policy expenditure goes up or not has a lot to do with military expenditure,
which might go up despite lower economic growth rates in Asia, precisely because solid
conflict-preventing norms and rules have not been agreed to in the region (Inoguchi,
2009a). This in turn leads me to turn to the security dimensions of regionalism.
4. Security dimensions of Japanese ideas of regionalism
The core of Japanese security calculus is the American security umbrella over Japan.
Japan may not be able to shoulder what would be huge defense costs without the United
States security umbrella. Japan deluded itself when the United States occupied Japan
after its resounding defeat in 1945. Overnight many Japanese transformed their thinking
from anti-American to pro-American. In other words, America went from being the
occupier to the defender. At the same time, most Japanese have been overwhelmingly
pacifist in the sense of rejecting Japan’s use of military force and bemoaning wars and
praying for peace. The irony is that the Japanese can only feel that they are secure with
America freely using military facilities on Japanese archipelagoes. Although the Japanese
self-defense forces do work alongside the United States armed forces in Japan, the former
cannot be effective alone without offensive armed forces. Only with United States
military involvement can the self-defense forces be defensively effective. Examining
the case of the Senkaku Islands, the United States government assures Japan of its
commitment to Japanese security in principle, but it maintains a policy of not taking
sides when a territorial sovereignty issue is involved. Article five of the Japan-United
States Security Treaty stipulates that the United States defends places where Japan
has effective administrative control, but it does not mention territorial sovereignty.
Furthermore, the 2002 agreement reached by the bilateral meeting between foreign
and defense ministers stipulates that the United States Armed Forces will intervene
to help Japan only when the Japanese self-defense forces are engaged in defending
themselves in combat areas. The geographical location of the Senkaku Islands is a
sensitive area. It is close to Taiwan, an island that China regards as being its own
unalienable sovereign territory. Furthermore, in 1992 the Chinese government passed
a law declaring the Diaoyutai (Senkaku) Islands are a Chinese territory. Although
Japan maintains effective control over the Islands and this control was internationally
recognized in 1895, the United States may not be very helpful to Japan in this respect,
and the Islands are located far from Tokyo and Japan’s naval facilities. Furthermore,
the maritime self-defense forces are not necessarily strong unless they are supported
by the United States Navy and Air Force. The question posed to Japan is how to
handle China’s excessive self-assurance action. Looking at United States foreign policy
from a Japanese perspective, one immediately notices that President George W. Bush’s
coalition policies with security allies such as Japan and President Barack Obama’s policy
of conducting multilateral diplomacy both visibly dilute the role and value of security
allies like Japan. When its only security ally is loosening its commitment to Japan, what
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are Japan’s options?: (1) to request the United States to enhance its commitment with
incentives such as sending the Japanese self-defense forces to areas where the United
States needs help; (2) to empower the Japanese self-defense forces to handle disputes
and conflicts; (3) to placate aggressive actors to calm down and deal with them without
using force; (4) to band together with a number of like-minded actors to constrain
aggressive actors in the region; (5) to bring aggressive actors into a forum in which
aspirational and/or binding norms and rules can be shaped together and agreed on. All
of these are being used and the last one is an aspect of Japanese ideas of regionalism.
After all, the ASEAN meetings have been almost the sole opportunity for the three
Northeast Asian countries to sit down together for some years. Since 2005, the East Asia
Summit has been another way of meeting not only with the ASEAN ten but also India,
Australia, and New Zealand. The Japanese calculus for creating the East Asia Summit
was to dilute the ability of aggressive actors to permeate the thinking of many ASEAN
countries by also including those states that do not necessarily regard aggressive actors
as the future. More recently, the three Northeast Asian leaders have sat together to talk
at least once a year. The fourth option is not used. Why? The answer given by Levy
and Thompson (2010) is that when the overall global security hegemony is retained
by the United States, regional balance of power fluidity is least likely to exist. That is
why China’s immense rise has not triggered power balancing by East and Southeast
Asian countries. What will happen when the United States military and naval bases
and facilities located in Japan are relocated to the United States territories or to some
other countries? It is uncertain. The point here, however, is that the Japanese ideas of
regionalism must take into account such a security calculus.
5. Various Japanese strands of Asian regionalism
Four major strands of Japanese ideas of Asian regionalism can be identified in
terms of geographical coverage: (1) fraternity-based East Asian community, (2) flying
geese-led economic community, (3) security-driven Arc of Freedom and Prosperity, (4)
Asia-Pacific Community. It is important to note here that I examine ideas and strands
of regionalism, not necessarily only government statements of regionalist proposals
pursued for a prolonged period of time.
5.1 Fraternity-based East Asian community
Former Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama of the Democratic Partyof Japan
presented in 2009 an idea based on fraternity. Fraternity is a key concept which is used
to stress the need to build confidence in prospective community members. Although
fraternity, yuuai, is a vague concept, Hatoyama apparently meant to inculcate basic trust
between Japan, Korea, and China. Hatoyama inherited his ideas from his grandfather,
Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama (r. 1955–1957), who had also been unhappy about
Japanese diplomacy that relied heavily on the United States and had felt the need to
inculcate the good neighborly relations with Korea and China. The peril of proximity
has featured in this trio’s relationship for a long time. Korea and China are the only two
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countries in Asia whose citizens perceive greater negative impact on their countries from
Japan than positive impact, according to an AsiaBarometer survey carried out during
the period between 2003 and 2008. The historical narratives of the trio are very different
from each other, always threatening like an active volcano. Hatoyama and those who
are of a similar persuasion use a grandiose and extremely vague idea precisely because
otherwise what functionalists would call regional economic integration would be a
glamorous castle standing on sand (sajo no rokaku). Bemoaning the prevailing distrust
towards Japan among citizens of Korea and China and the consistent failure of historical
accounts of key events and personalities in modern East Asian history to converge, two
programs have been put in place between the trio. First, massive citizen-to-citizen
mutual visit programs organized by central and local governments. This program
started when Yasuhiro Nakasone was prime minister in the period 1982–1987. Second,
joint bilateral government commissions with Korea and with China were set up to
study history. This program started after Socialist Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama
issued what has become the standard statement on Japanese debt to history. Since trade
among the trio surpassed 50% of their total trade in the early 2000s, functionalists
may boast of the steady and solid economic foundations of community. This school of
thought, however, argues that since economics works reasonably well, spirit and heart
must be brought into a community in which they are deficient. What are meant by spirit
and heart? What are key benchmarks of spirit and heart? Kanji (Chinese ideographs)
culture in East Asia is like Latin in medieval Europe and constitutes the common
spirit in East Asia. Asianism in Japan constitutes heart in Japanese thinking. It is a
passion sometimes verging on anti-Americanism. The reason Hatoyama is perceived
by the United States government as possibly anti-American seems to lie in his apparent
Asianism. After Hatoyama resigned from the prime ministership, he said that he wanted
to achieve what his grandfather, prime minister Ichiro Hatoyama, had tried in vain to
achieve, that is to liberate Japan from the status of an American appendix by way of
major revision of the Constitution and of the Japan-United States Security Treaty. It
is important to note that the Japanese idea of Asianism is not necessarily endorsed by
the majority. Rather, like British voices about Europe, Japanese voices about Asia are
split into two, the maritime Asia-Oriented school and the Continental Asia-Oriented
school. Hatoyama belongs to the latter.
5.2 Flying geese economic community
School textbooks in Japan normally use the following sentence to characterize
Japan. As Japan has few natural resources, it has been necessary to develop
technological know-how and to build up manufacturing and processing industries
and to manufacture industrial goods for export to purchase food, energy, and mineral
resources from abroad. Thanks to such hard work, Japan has been able to move forward
at the technological frontier.
The task confronting Japan is harder as the tide of globalization permeates every
place so that whatever advantage Japan may enjoy now in this or that area is bound
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to be lost. Even if advantage is partially lost, by shifting the location of factories Japan
can move forward using older technologies and investing in research and development
activities. To keep the number one position on as many technological frontiers as
possible, Japan will remain the lead goose followed by other geese flying as a group.
This flying geese group has been translated into a regionalist group. As a matter of
fact, the majority understanding of Japanese regionalist ideas focuses on the flying
geese economic community encompassing East and Southeast Asia, and on resources,
technology, products, and the environment. Needless to say, geographical coverage
changes over time. In the medium term, the flying geese pattern will encompass far
more areas, including India, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, and Kazakhstan.
Although the flying geese model is a regionalist idea, in the medium term it may evolve
into a globalist model with a somewhat narrow scope. What is widely believed to be
Japan’s Achilles heel is the weakness of higher education, especially the inability to
attract able researchers, and the low level of investment in building the organizational
and social infrastructure for sustained top-level advanced research at universities and
higher research institutions. Another weakness may be the inordinate emphasis on the
Japanese characteristics of such flying geese endeavors, such as using Japanese language
and team practice.
5.3 Arc of freedom and prosperity community
This is the idea launched by Foreign Minister Taro Aso in 2007. The idea combines
a number of more politically motivated foreign policy concerns: democracy building in
former authoritarian societies, education to achieve gender equality in Islamic societies,
building anti-terrorist coordination networks etc., in a number of countries starting
from maritime East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, and
ending with Baltic states as if the Arc encircled China. However, the key motivations
were to fine tune policy to align with President George W. Bush’s anti-terrorist actions
and to enhance Japan’s ties with those countries to which it has rarely attended in the
recent past through the use of official development assistance and the exchange of state
guests’ visits and other policy instruments. With the end of the Bush presidency, the idea
has been transformed into more or less routine policies, including some anti-terrorist
international coordination.
5.4 Asia-Pacific community
This is one of the oldest ideas of regionalism. It encompasses the United States and
Pacific countries, including Latin American countries along with East and Southeast
Asia. This idea of Asian regionalism is embodied in the institution called the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation conference (APEC). Already it has been solidly bureaucratized
like the OECD. Its key tasks are the monitoring, reporting, and analyzing of primarily
economic movements of the huge region called the Asia-Pacific. It originated in a
Japanese and Australian idea (Saburo Okita and John Crawford) to monitor and assist
further economic development and trade and investment when Asian countries were
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Table 1. Six bureaucratically centered models of regional order
Key concept Key Agency Nature of regional order
(1) alliance Foreign Affairs Greater East Asia diluting expansive
China
(2) free trade Economics &
Industry
bilateral economic partnership package
in a vacuum of WTO multilateralism
(3) currency Treasury emergency provision of foreign reserves
paving the way to an Asian euro
(4) defense Defense self-strengthening within Pax-Americana
(5) environment Environment regional cooperation in demography,
energy and the environment, leading
to a regional environmental regime
(6) subnational linkage Internal
Communications
and Affairs
dense subnational interactions and
linkages, paving the way to a dense
regional community
still at the slowly developing stages. In the late 1960s, the Asia-Pacific map, sized in
terms of per capita income level, looked like the two giants, Japan and Australia,
sandwiching small Asian economies. The members have grown in number and the
scope of its activities has grown enormously. But it is essentially an international
organization, characterized by United States participation, professional technocratic
work, and no binding power. As a matter of fact, Japan may not dislike this style of
regional organization. President Barack Obama’s Trans-Pacific Economic Partnership
(TPP) idea is along the lines of the Asia Pacific Community model with stress on norms
and rules and more binding power. For this reason, Japanese views have split into two
categories, agricultural protectionism-environmentalism and agricultural liberalizers.
6. Six bureaucratically centered models of regional order
Now, I turn to a number of regional order models that have been articulated by key
bureaucratic agencies (Inoguchi, 2009b). I compare the following given models (see
Table 1), each of which has a key concept that is presumed to work as a driving force
of regional order. Geographical frameworks differ from one to another, reflecting the
core constituencies of each model’s designer.1 It is important to note that Japanese
bureaucratic agencies exercise some semi-sovereign power within the government
constitutionally as well as in terms of the historically molded institutional framework
(Inoguchi and Jain, forthcoming in 2011).Packaging some of them is not so easy. That
is why there are so many models in Japan. The opposite side of the same coin is that
the aggregating, synthesizing, and integrating actors, such as the Prime Minister, have
1 These models are sub-models of Japanese foreign policy. The Japanese foreign policy models at a
broader and more grandiose level are presented in Inoguchi (2000).
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not been powerful enough to articulate their lines and appeal vigorously to the rest of
the region.
6.1 Alliance model
The alliance model is promoted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with its two key
concerns being the alliance with the United States and its associated slogans of freedom,
liberal democracy, and free market. Its latest manifestations are the two concepts: the
East Asia Summit (the ASEAN plus Six), and the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.2 The
East Asia Summit has been installed in part to thwart the potentially China-dominant
ASEAN plus China and Korea grouping. That is why three countries were added
to its members – India, Australia, and New Zealand. But before it was inaugurated,
China wielded its influence among the ASEAN members in shaping the agenda and
other matters as well. The competition between the two major powers seemed to end
with the somewhat diluted interest of many members in the organization itself. Then
the Ministry of Economics and Industry managed to get its proposal to set up the
organization’s think tank, an Institute of Economic Research at Bangkok or Hanoi,
accepted at the East Asia Summit. The ERIA, the Economic Research Institute for East
Asia and the ASEAN, subsequently was established in Jakarta. This leads to the Ministry
of Economics and Industry’s bilateral free trade centered model. The other model by
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity model, whereby
those countries surrounding China and Russia in East and Southeast Asia, South and
Central Asia, the Middle East, and Central Europe are portrayed as being linked with
each other in their common aspiration for freedom and prosperity. Registering a clear
departure from the erstwhile pragmatic, down-to-earth, low profile slogans of Japan,
it waves the flag of freedom, liberal democracy, and the free market. It makes clear that
Japan’s agenda involves the taming of China and Russia – if this is possible at all. It
is not a coincidence that Japan has recently agreed to the provision of nuclear energy
generation technologies to such countries as Kazakhstan, Vietnam, and Indonesia.
6.2 Free trade model
The Ministry of Economics and Industry’s previous favorite imagery of East
and Southeast Asia was the flying geese formation of industrialization, trade, and
investment, with Japan leading the flock in the region. Now that Japan’s developmental
momentum has undeniably shifted to others, and now that the tide of globalization
permeates each and every part of the region, Japan attempts to pull other countries
2 The conventional set of Japanese foreign policy statements since 1952 normally contains three pillars:
alliance with the United States, neighborly friendship with Asia, and upholding the United Nations as
an entry into influence. Since 9/11, a new set of Japanese foreign policy statements have been introduced.
In addition to how to uphold the spirit of alliance and manage alliance politics with the United States,
Japan seeks (1) to uphold and spread the spirit of alliance abroad on the one hand and (2) to emphasize
the need to consolidate Japan’s position vis-a`-vis its rising neighbors on the other. See, for instance,
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Speech (2007) and Foreign Minister Taro Aso’s speech (2006).
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towards itself with what is called a bilateral economic partnership agreement, while
keeping the concept of the flying geese formation alive and expanded. It is a good
contrast to a United States-led neoliberal bilateral free trade agreement that strongly
pushes everyone in a market-driven direction. Conversely, the Japanese initiative is
meant to be agreement friendly to each economy’s non-competitive sectors, at least
in the short term. When the World Trade Organization has been unable to reach a
compromise on agricultural liberalization, financial and other services, intellectual
property rights, environmental degradation etc., it is argued that a bilateral economic
partnership agreement is the best answer in that it facilitates bilateral trade liberalization
step by step. Clearly, the East Asia Summit’s think tank funded by Japan’s Ministry of
Economics and Industry is a symbol of this model. Needless to say, opposition to
a bilateral free trade agreement approach has been so strong as to prevent Japanese
agreements with key countries like the United States, the European Union, and the
Association of South-East Asian Nations. In contrast, President Lee Myung-bak boasts
that Korea has been trying to expand what he calls the largest world economic territory,
meaning the combined space covered by bilateral free trade agreements with Korea
(Asahi shimbun, 2011).
6.3 Currency model
Stunned by the Asian financial crisis in 1997–1998, the Ministry of Treasury has been
putting forward the idea of an Asian currency, a common currency akin to the euro in
the European Union. The sudden dearth of foreign reserves in an emergency should be
avoided by the timely supply of foreign currency by an Asian Monetary Fund. Short of
this, due to the refusal of the United States government and the International Monetary
Fund, the Ministry of Treasury has been enhancing the foreign reserve pooling and
providing schemes through the Asian Development Bank. This is one of the schemes
devised to cope with the fast and massive capital flows in an era of globalization. The
ultimate goal is an Asian currency which might become realized in a nebulous future.
With a common currency used for all businesses, transaction costs are kept minimal.
With the increasingly large size of combined GNPs and combined trade in the region,
an Asian currency would be able to compete with the United States dollar and the
euro in the longer term, at least according to the Ministry of Treasury. With China and
India expected to be in ascendance for some time to come and with Japan about to
emerge again with advanced technological innovations achieved during the hard times
of recession and deflation, an Asian currency has a future, at least according to the
currency model.
6.4 Defense model
The Ministry of Defense has recently achieved its half-a-century-long dream
of increasing its status from agency level to ministry level. Befitting the era of the
revolution in military affairs, it seeks highly advanced weapons. Because the United
States still occupies the lion’s share – 85% – of world weapons research and development
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investment, it will continue to be the only dominant military power for at least the
next two to three decades. By Japan joining forces with the United States, not only can
Japan build its defense and deterrence system in a consolidated fashion, but it can also
help the United States retain and extend its predominant position for a longer period
of time. Hence Japan’s willingness to invest in missile defense, satellite intelligence,
anti-terrorist network formation, peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, and
the partial sharing of weapons, codes, and intelligence, etc. At the same time, the
Defense Ministry argues that Japanese pacifism and its reluctance to use force needs
to be overcome first at home, that is in the self-defense forces in which constitutionally
those military officers and soldiers are not treated as equal to civilian service personnel.
Hence, the overall reluctance of the Defense Ministry to send troops abroad, whether
for peacekeeping or combat purposes.
6.5 Environment model
Deterioration in the quality of air and water in the region has been noted repeatedly.
The inefficient use of energy, the alarming shortage of water, the mindless emission of
poisonous byproducts of manufacturing and mining, the careless treatment of nuclear
power plants, the decreasing arable land, the rising sea levels, and the contagious rise of
infectious disease are but a few of the symptoms of the environmental problematique.
The Ministry of Environment has been busy concluding agreements on technological
cooperation in environmental areas. Not surprisingly, a broad convergence of public
opinion calls for governments to put a high priority on environmental degradation in
Japan, South Korea and China as registered in the AsiaBarometer Survey (Fukushima
and Okabe, 2006). The high priority consensus on the environment among the
Northeast Asian three – Japan, South Korea, and China – at the grassroots level is
most noteworthy. In a similar vein, technological agreements with such countries as
Kazakhstan, Vietnam, and Indonesia with regard to the safety measures in nuclear
power generation plants have been concluded recently. Given the alarmingly rapid
increase in the demand for energy in the region and beyond, environmental policy
cooperation cannot be overemphasized.
6.6 Subnational linkage model
Globalization breaks down the organic unity of the nation-state. Rather it packages
an unexpected team of players at different spatial locations for common economic
advantage. The movement of people for business, tourism, and other purposes is
rapidly increasing in the region. Unthinkable even a decade ago, immigration continues
to rapidly increase in Japan. One of the subway stations, about 30 minutes away from
Central Tokyo station, is crowded every morning with hundreds of Indian professionals
commuting. More than ten thousand Indians live in that area alone. They work mostly in
the financial service sector and IT areas. Along similar lines, millions of Chinese tourists
visit Japan every year. They constitute a major source of tourist income for Japanese
tourist industries. Many traditional inns with communal single sex hot spring baths
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tailor themselves to the taste of Chinese tourists. The traditional communal hot spring
big bath has been changed to individual hot spring baths attached to each hotel room
to meet the preference of Chinese tourists who abhor public nudity. Language learning
has been on the steady increase in the region. Only two decades ago Japanese language
teaching was forbidden in South Korea. Half a century ago Japanese universities did not
teach the Korean language except in a few rare cases. Now in both countries language
training in Korean and Japanese respectively is thriving. Language instruction in China
and Japan shows a similar trend. Fudan University in Shanghai has 75 professors who
read and speak Japanese, whereas the University of Tokyo has some 25 professors
who read and speak Chinese. Subnational linkage is handled mostly by the Ministries
of Internal Communications and Affairs and of National Land and Transport. Local
governments often lead subnational linkages. More noteworthy are non-governmental
and transnational organizations that spearhead such linkages.
7. Regionalism and globalism
Having noted at the outset that regionalism has inherent problems of collective
action (costs of collective entrepreneurship and free riders), geography as destiny
(geographical neighbors as given), and globalization as the end of geography (tyranny
of distance reduced), I have examined the Japanese ideas of Asian regionalism in
normative, economic, and security terms, because regionalism has to face value-laden,
utilitarian and national interest equations. Then I have characterized four Japanese
ideas of Asian regionalism: fraternity-based East Asian community, flying geese-led
economic community, security-driven arc of freedom and prosperity, and the Asia-
Pacific community. Having approached the subject this way, I want to examine
the angles of regionalism and globalism in relation to the Japanese ideas of Asian
regionalism. Globalism is here defined as the aspiration and action to unite on a global
basis.
Before examining the Japanese ideas of Asian regionalism, I want to recapitulate
what I understand as the logic of European regionalism in order to enable Asian
regionalist ideas to be compared. European regionalism has many equations (Murray,
2008). First, the immediate task was to empower Western Europe vis-a`-vis the Soviet
Union, which had been enhanced by World War II, through building joint Atlantic forces
with the United States command by way of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Security-wise it represented the American advance into Europe. Second, the no-less
immediate task was to recover from the ashes of war. To recover and develop, borders
and barriers to economic and other interactions and transactions had to be reduced
step by step. Starting with pooling energy and then enabling free trade of products and
free movement of people in the European Community, it achieved a unified common
currency with the Maastricht Treaty of 2000. Economic regionalism was to build a
Europe that could stand alone without being bothered too much by the United States
and the Soviet Union. The United States was comfortable with the idea of self-sustaining
Europe as long as it was committed to free trade, democracy, and common defense
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vis-a`-vis the Soviet Union. Third, European regionalism has become very normatively
oriented. The European Union attempts to inculcate ‘good European citizens’. Some
such as Laidi (2008) have gone as far as to claim that the European Union is a normative
empire. Freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, market capitalism, and the
peaceful resolution of international disputes are some of those principles which
the European Union wants member aspirants to demonstrate in order to prove that
they are eligible and credible candidates.
Although the above is pitifully brief, at least it provides the basis for a comparison
of Asian regionalism. First, unlike Europe, which saw the Soviet Union as a threat, Asia
has not excluded China as a possible member of various regionalist ideas. This aspect
puts strains and stresses intermittently on some other regional actors since China is
different from most other states in the region. Second, while Europe has adopted a
step-by-step approach by making explicit the criteria for inclusion and exclusion, Asia
has been hesitant to adopt such an approach to membership. Rather Asia often seems
to collectively adopt an ambiguous strategy as to membership criteria and regionalist
goals. Third, unlike Europe, which is self-conscious regarding norms and rules, Asia is
seemingly hesitant to be specific in these respects. When norms of sorts are mentioned,
they tend to be very vague and not well articulated. Recent examples are ‘harmonious
society’ (Hu Jintao) and fraternity (Yukio Hatoyama).
This comparison brings me to note that Europe wants to cope with globalism
by uniting itself, whereas Asia wants to adapt to globalism, which permeates their
national life, primarily directly and not necessarily through a transnational regional
organization. Since there is no transnational regional organization empowered with
authority and capacity in Asia, no government is willing to place its future in the hands
of a non-existent transnational organization. Most Asian states seem to regard state
sovereignty as nearly sacrosanct. They seem to think that delegating part of sovereign
power to a transnational regional organization is highly problematic. If some states in
Europe take collective action for rescue operations in Greece, some states in Asia take
non-coordinated action to purchase United States Treasury Bonds. If some Europeans
take action to save Greece or other countries in the region, it is to save the unity of the
European Union. If some Asians take action to save the United States, it is in part to save
the United States to endure its difficulties longer and recover faster than without such
intervention. To shift from East Asia to Southeast Asia, the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations has held non-interference in internal affairs as its first principle for more
than four decades. When the South China Sea Declaration for Action was agreed on
in 2002, it did not contain any binding power. In the 2000s, a few maritime incidents
took place in the South China Sea with some ASEAN states and China claiming that
certain islands were part of their exclusive economic zones or territorial waters. China
warned that it would not deal with a joint ASEAN actor. Nor did ASEAN states seem
to pursue joint action vis-a`-vis China. When states are unlikely to form a coalition
within a region, it will not be easy to move forward to create a regional organization
with authority embodied in the organization itself. All of this is meant to say that Asian
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ideas of regionalism, including Japanese ideas of Asian regionalism, do not seem to
point to the direction of the imminent formation of regionalism with binding power.
It is only through the arduous process of interaction and transactions over many more
years that Asian regionalism may bear some fruit. The four Japanese ideas of Asian
regionalism that we have examined will grow as workable regionalist formulas only by
going through more challenges successfully.
8. Conclusion
Northeast Asia is a thriving region. It is also a huge and complex region with players
riding on the tide of globalization (Tan, 2009) as well as on its multilayered historical
and cultural legacies (e.g., Goto-Jones, 2010). Therefore, the region provides many
splendid opportunities and some pitfalls unless diverse perspectives and sentiments are
well kept in mind. Japanese ideas of Asian regionalism on the whole try to inculcate
‘good neighborly’ relationship and ‘strategic win-win’ situations regionally with heavy
reliance on trade, inventions, technology, the environments.
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